Monday, June 3, 2013

NEVIS Review N0 18 , Section II , Ref# 18.2


NEVIS Review N0 18
Section II
Ref# 18.2
June 3, 2013
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(Ed’ note- The following incisive and thoughtful  article on Pan-Africanism is by Dr Costantinos, a frequent contributor to NEVIS. We would like to thank Dr Costantinos for his continuous association with NEVIS. Dr Costantinos is a Professor of Public Policy, School of Graduate Studies, Addis Ababa University.We are really honored to have intellectuals of high caliber like him in our series of articles in NEVIS. We would also thank our hundreds of readers who eagerly expect our semi-monthly articles, and continuously encourage us for the (volunteer) work we love to do..The following is part I of the article titled,” The Promises & Pitfalls of Pan-Africanism :Ideological and agency trajectories for African Integration”. Part two, which shall deal with “Ideological basis for Pan-Africanism and African unification  and the conclusion part, will appear in the our next edition. NEVIS ET*)

The Promises & Pitfalls of
Pan-Africanism
Ideological and agency trajectories for African Integration
Part I

By Costantinos BT Costantinos, PhD

A dialogue starter ‘think piece’ for African Union Summit
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Abstract

Pan-Africanism represents the complexities of black political and intellectual thought over two hundred years. What constitutes Pan-Africanism, what one might include in a Pan-African movement often changes according to whether the focus is on politics, ideology, organisations or culture. Pan-
Africanism actually reflects a range of political views. At a basic level, it is a belief that African peoples,
both on the African continent and in the Diaspora, share not merely a common history, but a common
destiny. This paper raises the tangential issues of the trajectories on the stewardship of African unification
are marked by uniquely austere organisational-strategic issues. Even under democratically favourable
contemporary global conditions, historical, ideological and strategic characteristics internal and external
to the unification process still would make that transition a costly exercise. African Unification, without
any doubt, is in crisis. Africa has very little, if any, experience in open democratic discourse and is
unfamiliar with the critical values and practices that anchor that culture and tradition. In the face of the
fact that past and present constitutions had never actually been effectively established as democratic
structures, they are criticised for failing to protect the rights of the citizenry. Such gross generalisations
attempt to assess failure and make a move in a game by reference to a set of rules, which on the one hand
are alien to the majority of the populace and had never been in forced, on the other. Significantly, this
depends upon the emergence of supportive set of political institutions that are recurrent and valued patterns of political behaviour that give shape and regularity to politics. The power of a given set of factors to explain these possibilities, the susceptibility of concepts to empirical investigation, and the potential of the approach to generate policy recommendations, however, will no wonder lead to an imperative to adopt an institutional approach. The key question is therefore whether the endowment of political institutions is conducive to African integration and unification!

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1. Introduction

Today, humankind stands on an extraordinary, and perhaps, seductive sets of dilemma: a
global lifestyle and value system in which the 21st century has ushered in unprecedented global
wealth; yet, such a lot that is all lavishly squandered, while Africa is haunted by an oppressive
present -- an embodiment of famine, wars, and devoured natural environment. The
interconnectedness of people and good governance locally and its impact on integration were
manifested by how seemingly minor incidences can turn into genocides of mind boggling
proportions that continue today two decades after Rwanda; fracturing the foundations of social
accord in distant communities. Although Africa is lumped as a political community, it is also a
continent, where various nationalities who speak over 2000 languages, enjoy varied cultures
and inhabited their own territories since ancient times. Nonetheless, it is also a new continent
modelled under the totalitarian rule of colonialists and the military that were handpicked to
replace them. Carrying arms became a sign of manly distinction. Coupled with Stalinist
ideology, the pervasive military ethos brewed military discipline to breed a culture of conformity
and uniformity. Hence, Pan Africanism grew out of 19th century efforts to end the slave trade.

“Colonialism, born out of the Berlin Conference had begun in earnest as of 1884 & 85. As a result
of these events black people worldwide began to realise that they faced slavery, colonisation, and
racism, and that it would be to their benefit to work together in an effort to solve these problems.
Out of this realisation came the Pan African Conferences of 1900 (London), 1919 (Paris), 1921
(London, Brussels, and Paris), 1923 (London), 1927 (New York)… Some of the most influential blacks
of the time participated in these meetings: Slyvester Williams, W.E.B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey,
Kwame Nkrumah, etc. The belief that people of African descent share a common history and culture
and should stick together was the principle idea behind Pan-Africanism: bringing all black people
together expressed through history, literature, music, art…, (Rosenberg, M., 2003).

The initial motive for this papers arose from Yoweri Museveni’s presentation of the Working
Document for the Tripartite Meeting (28 August 2004) to the presidents of Kenya, Tanzania and
Uganda; a presentation that set the tone for African political, economic and social integration.

Museveni rightly underpins the excessive ‘balkanisation’ of Africa, asserting there from the need
to take decisive strategic action in respect of politician integration. He further goes on to ask “why
do I think that economic integration is not enough to guarantee the future of the black man even if it
is successfully implemented? “Economic integration, without political integration, is slow. It will
take longer for the benefits of integration to spread around the (continent) evenly. It also splits our
consciousness.” He goes on to alarm the world on the greatest danger looming over our heads. He
underlines the “fact that while Europeans and Americans are now basing themselves on Mars and
outer-space, Africa has almost forgotten how to make the spear. Africa was conquered and the
spectre of Slave Trade was visited on us because we lagged behind in technology. Africans today
survive at the mercy of others. Rationality would have propelled us to quickly use the recovery of
our independence to ensure that Africa stands up once and for all time”.[1] Museveni audaciously
declares how “Africa was plundered but survived the slave trade, colonialism and the neo-colonial
regimes. We survived Western Imperialism. Are we to wait for what future Asian imperialism will
offer? We occupy one of the biggest land masses with considerable natural resources. Why can we
not turn, at least, parts of this land mass into a powerful base for the Black race?”


This paper raises the tangential issues of the trajectories on the stewardship of African
unification that are marked by uniquely austere organisational-strategic issues. Even under
democratically favourable contemporary global conditions, historical, ideological and strategic
characteristics internal and external to the unification process still would make it a costly
exercise. African Unification, without any doubt, is in crisis. It heavily depends on the legitimacy
of national democratic process that is honest, predictable, transparent and accountable in the
execution of the African states’ broader unification responsibility. It is apparent that as the
continent enters this new era of political pluralism there is a need to overhaul the administrative
machinery and develop institutional alternatives to the centralised, bureaucratic and
hierarchical organisational structure of the state; that will determine the terms of entry into the
unification process.
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2. The Pitfalls and Promises of Pan Africanism:

2.1.The Scramble for Africa:

The Scramble for Africa, also known as the Race for Africa was a process of invasion,
occupation, colonisation and annexation of African territory by European powers during the
New Imperialism period, between 1881 and World War I in 1914. Because of the heightened
tension between European states in the last quarter of the 19th century, the partitioning of
Africa may be seen as a way for the Europeans to eliminate the threat of a Europe-wide war over
Africa. The last 59 years of the 19th century saw transition from "informal imperialism" of control through military influence and economic dominance to that of direct rule. The Portuguese had been the first post-Middle Ages Europeans to firmly establish settlements, trade posts, permanent fortifications and ports of call along the coast of the African continent, from the beginning of the Age of Discovery, in the 15th century. There was little interest in, and less knowledge of, the interior for some two centuries thereafter.

European exploration of the African interior began in earnest at the end of the 18th century.
By 1835, Europeans had mapped most of north-western Africa. In the middle decades of the
19th century, the most famous of the European explorers were David Livingstone and H. M.
Stanley, both of whom mapped vast areas of Southern Africa and Central Africa. Arduous
expeditions in the 1850s and 1860s by Richard Burton, John Speke and James Grant located the
great central lakes and the source of the Nile. By the end of the 19th century, Europeans had
charted the Nile from its source, traced the courses of the Niger, Congo and Zambezi Rivers, and
realised the vast resources of Africa. Even as late as the 1870s, European states still controlled
only 10 percent of the African continent, all their territories being near the coast. The most
important holdings were Angola and Mozambique, held by Portugal; the Cape Colony, held by
the United Kingdom; and Algeria, held by France.

By 1914, only Ethiopia, Liberia and the Dervish State were independent of European control.
Technological advancement facilitated overseas expansionism. Industrialisation brought about
rapid advancements in transportation and communication, especially in the forms of steam
navigation, railways, and telegraphs. Medical advances also were important, especially
medicines for tropical diseases. The development of quinine, an effective treatment for malaria,
enabled vast expanses of the tropics to be accessed by Europeans.[2]  However, in Africa –
exclusive of the area which became the Union of South Africa in 1910 – the amount of capital
investment by Europeans was relatively small, compared to other continents. Consequently, the
companies involved in tropical African commerce were relatively small, apart from Cecil
Rhodes's De Beers Mining Company. Rhodes had carved out Rhodesia for himself; Léopold II of
Belgium later, and with considerably greater brutality, exploited the Congo Free State. These
events might detract from the pro-imperialist arguments of colonial lobbies such as the
Alldeutscher Verband, Francesco Crispi and Jules Ferry, who argued that sheltered overseas
markets in Africa would solve the problems of low prices and over-production caused by
shrinking continental markets.

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2.2. Pan-Africanism - A brief history:

Pan-Africanism represents the complexities of black political and intellectual thought over
two hundred years. What constitutes Pan-Africanism? Pan-African movement often changes
according to whether the focus is on politics, ideology, organisations or culture. Pan-Africanism
actually reflects a range of political views. At a basic level, it is a belief that African peoples, both
on the African continent and in the Diaspora, share not merely a common history, but a
common destiny. This sense of interconnected pasts and futures has taken many forms,
especially in the creation of political institutions. One of the earliest manifestations of Pan-
Africanism came in the names that Africans gave to their religious institutions [3]

An important political form of a religious Pan-Africanist worldview appeared in the form of
Ethiopianism. Ethiopia’s African diasporic religious symbolism grew in the 1800s among blacks in the United States and the Caribbean, through a reading of Psalm 68:31, “Ethiopia shall
soon stretch forth its hands unto God,” as a prophesy that God would redeem Africa and free the
enslaved. The verse served as a bulwark against a racist theology that declared black people were
the descendants of Ham, the cursed son of Noah whose children were to be the hewers of wood
and drawers of water. Ethiopianism thus emerged initially as a psychic resistance to racist
theology, soon becoming the basis of a nascent political organizing. Négritude is a literary and
ideological movement, developed by francophone black intellectuals, writers, and politicians in
France in the 1930s. Its founders included the future Senegalese President Léopold Sédar
Senghor, Martinican poet Aimé Césaire, and the Guianan Léon Damas. The Négritude writers
found solidarity in a common black identity as a rejection of perceived French colonial racism.
They believed that the shared black heritage of members of the African Diaspora was the best
tool in fighting against French political and intellectual hegemony and domination. They formed
a realistic literary style and formulated their Marxist ideas as part of this movement.
Ethiopianism took institutional form in South Africa; African diasporic activist-intellectuals
were beginning to convene pan-African conferences. The first of these was the Chicago
Conference on Africa, convened on August 14, 1893.[4] In southern Africa in the late-1800s,
Ethiopianism assumed institutional form following visits from the African Methodist Episcopal
Church, especially Bishop Henry McNeal Turner.[5]  (Bogues, Anthony, 2003; Esedebe, P. Olisanwuche,
1994; Fierce, Milfred C., 1993 & James, C.L.R, 1995.)
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2.3.Congresses and Communist Movements

By the 1920s, Pan-Africanism represented an ideology with multiple currents. Along with
Garvey and the UNIA, several others pursued Pan-African liberation. The African Blood
Brotherhood was an extremely small organisation by comparison, never reaching more than a
few thousand members. Its members, especially its founder Cyril Briggs (from the small
Leeward Island of Nevis), the Barbadian orator Richard B. Moore, and the African-American
social worker and clubwoman Grace Campbell, articulated a Pan-African politics that sought to
link African liberation, national independence in the Caribbean, and anti-racist struggles in the
United States with proletarian revolution for socialism. Many ABB members became the first
black members of the American Communist Party and pursued their Pan-African vision within
the institutions of the Moscow-based Communist International, where they met and built ties
with Francophone black radicals in Paris, as well as West African activists. (Lemelle, Sidney and
Robin Kelley , 1994 & Magubane, Bernard Makhosezwe, 1987. )

The most enduring representation of early-twentieth-century Pan-Africanism came in the
Pan-African congresses. W. E. B. Du Bois, the renowned scholar and intellectual who headed the
National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People’s publicity department, where he
edited its magazine The Crisis, had been a member of Crummell’s American Negro Academy
and participated in the 1900 Pan-African Conference in London.[6] The fourth PAC, organised by
the Women’s International Circle for Peace and Foreign Relations (a black women’s club in New
York led by Addie W. Hunton, Nina Du Bois and Minnie Pickens,) met in 1927. It was originally
to meet in Tunisia or the Caribbean, but when the French and British governments blocked the
congress, it was moved to New York City. At the New York congress, former African Blood
Brothers Richard B. Moore and Otto Huiswoud pushed the adoption of a resolution supporting
black workers and calling for Egyptian, Chinese and Indian liberation, and urging Caribbean
national liberation and federation [7] (Martin, Tony, 1976, Moses, Wilson, 2004 & Taylor, Ula, 2002)
Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere convened the last Pan-African Congress June 17–19,
1974, in Dar es Salaam. Commonly known as the Six PAC, this was the first congress held in
Africa. Nyerere considered this meeting, coming after national liberation had spread throughout
Africa and the Caribbean, as an opportunity to discuss the “means, and further, the progress, of
opposition to racialism, colonialism, oppression and exploitation everywhere,” and placing these
in “the context of a worldwide movement for human equality and national self-determination.”
Alluding to the new challenges presented by independence, Nyerere asked those present to recognise that “an end to colonialism is not an end to the oppression of man,” and to continue working “against oppression by the leaders of those countries which have recently attained freedom, whether this is directed against other black men and women, or against people of different races.” (Walters, Ronald W., 1993)
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3. Political contestation in Africa: beacons of hope or serious disappointments?

It is worth pointing out that overall noticeable changes in the direction of democratisation
process, or more accurately political liberalisation process, have occurred but this process
remains constantly threatened by the exorbitant weight of the central power concentrated in the
hands of the executive branch and the scale of the economic problems awaiting solution.

3.1. Constitutional conferences and reforms:
Africa has very little, if any, experience in open democratic discourse and is unfamiliar with
the critical values and practices that anchor democratic culture and tradition. In the face of the
fact that past and present “Constitutions” had never actually been effectively established,
especially as democratic structures, they are criticised for failing "to protect the rights of the
citizenry". Such gross generalisations attempt to assess failure and make a move in a game by
reference to a set of rules which on the one hand are alien to the majority of the populace and
had never been in place and in force on the other. Democracy must actually exist, take definite
shape and structure and become a working process, before particular criticisms, claims and
demands can be based on it. In this sense and generally speaking, constitutional reforms have
been key elements in the transition resulting in major restructuring of the African polity. On the
other hand, it would not be a gross violation to say that, thanks to the presence of a majority
parliamentary group devolved to the party in power, the national assemblies have played and
continue to play the role of rubber stamp chamber. Nowhere have an elected representative
challenged the Executive and the spirit of the single party practices continues except in Ghana
and Zambia. The judiciary power has played a more visible role by the favourable judgements
rendered to certain opponents in the regime bad books.
------------------------------

3.2.Federalism, ethnicity and the re-institutions of traditional systems:
A lot has been said here and there about decentralisation yet the debate on federalism has
not been deepened from fear of seeing national unity disintegrate as the case with Tanzania and
Zanzibar, Cameroon -- Anglophone and Francophone. In Uganda the Buganda kingdom
partisans have forced the debate on federalism in the context of the drafting of the new
constitution; and the talks on decentralisation as a means to satisfy the Velleities of the Touareg
Independence Movement in Mali. The single most important influence over how transitions
have been conceived is the politics of ethnic self-determination and self-government. Consistent
with this strategy, Governments have undertaken a major restructuring of the nation-state,
cutting it up into a score of sub-states based on ethnic identity. One major obstacle to efforts to
install and consolidate democratic system in Africa is the all powerful, highly centralised and
hierarchical bureaucratic structure.[8]

African Unification, without any doubt, is in crisis. It heavily depends on the legitimacy of
national democratic process that will in turn depend in important ways on it being perceived as
reasonably honest, predictable, transparent and accountable in the execution of the African
states’ broader unification responsibility. Public sector corruption and inefficiencies undermine
political, economic and social stability by undermining citizen’s faith in the democratic process.
In situations where public officials are seen to be using their positions to advance parochial
interest and self-aggrandisement, a general loss of respect for authority and the law occurs and
despondency in the general population develops. It is apparent that as the continent enters this
new era of political pluralism and democratic governance there is a need to overhaul the
administrative machinery and develop institutional alternatives to the centralised, bureaucratic
and hierarchical organisational structure of the state. (Costantinos, BT., 1996)

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3.3.Unanswered questions of African unification:
Because discussions leading to African futures tend to be one of dejection, the so called post-Cold War political history of the continent is fast replacing African economics as the morbid art or science. But caution, not cynicism, should be the craft of the well wisher - as has been amply demonstrated by Museveni. While participants in the complex traffic web of African futures could be torn between professional caution and the genuine desire for a better future for their continent, repeated attempts to dispel the prevailing gloom by pointing to the bright spots of the
African past and calls for the fostering of those cultural resources to check the overall drift
towards ‘non-unification’ have not yielded to popular demands, that raises some questions.

- What do we mean by African unification in the first place?
- Does unification have indigenous roots?
- Is perhaps all this talk of African unification an academic or a public relations exercise?

Lurking in the background of all these questions is the rather disturbing one: is
perhaps all this talk of African unification an academic or a public relations
exercise? The stark reality of the new concept of the failed state in Somalia and the
“community-based” and locally-perpetrated genocide in Rwanda, to name a few, make
this last question less cynical than it would otherwise appear at first sight. Indeed as
Museveni asserts “Africans today are surviving at the mercy of others. Rationality
would have propelled us to quickly use the recovery of our independence to ensure that
Africa stands up once and for all time. The independence and Post-independence
African leaders need to bear the historical responsibility for the future tragedies that
may befall the Africans in future.” African leaders are articulate in stating their
unification aims and positions and in promoting them within and through the AU; but to
describe the strategy is problematique for a number of reasons.

African States cannot be expected to know all their political objectives and means-ends
calculation openly when it comes to issue of unity and one cannot suppose that their formally
declared aims and purposes exhaust their ideological and strategic intentions. Hence, the way in
which Museveni envisions the concepts and goals of political unification in specific contexts may
be at variance with the global “meaning” or “sense” attributed to them. The specific mode of
concern about African unification may be more revolutionary than processual, egalitarian than
liberal, or more substantive than procedural. Or, it may switch from the liberal code or
structural model of union to the revolutionary code unpredictably. These possibilities make the
task of describing Museveni’s unionising reform objectives a bit difficult. The articulation of
ideas and ends of unification is not monolithic. It is modulated within the network of domestic
and foreign participants. It includes statements of aims for “general audiences”, like the goal of
securing peace and stability and prevention of balkanisation. But it also includes discourses and
associated objectives designed primarily, though not exclusively, for consumption by specific
constituencies.

For these reasons, it is not easy to give an exact account of African unification goals and
ultimate political ends pursued by Museveni. The author has lingering doubts and questions
about the current status and mission of the dominant regional organisations and at the core of
them the African Union about the nature of the alliance that all point up the need for caution
in taking Museveni’s declaratory goals of “African unification” at face value. Nevertheless, one
can describe fairly accurately the declared reform goals on the assumption that they are
significant, if not exhaustive, indicators of Museveni’s real intentions. This is admittedly a
simplifying assumption, but one which provides a point of departure for analysing an involved
and controversial strategy. What does this leave for African Unity? Practically nothing but
problems to solve! African Unity needs to be built - and built - virtually from scratch.
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Notes
[1] ] “African leaders need to bear the historical responsibility for the future tragedies that may befall the Africans in future. Space-based weapons are going to be the dominant forms of aggression. The Black race is just sitting in these micro political units created by Colonialism (the 53 States of the African Union) completely oblivious of what is going on in the World. What always amazes me is the ability of Africans to hate themselves and love their enemies. We love and get mesmerised by the strength and might of others but we are indifferent to building our own?”

[2] Sub-Saharan Africa, one of the last regions of the world largely untouched by "informal imperialism", was also attractive to Europe's ruling elites for economic and racial reasons. During a time when Britain's balance of trade showed a growing deficit, with shrinking and increasingly protectionist continental markets due to the Long Depression (1873–96), Africa offered Britain, Germany, France and other countries an open market that would garner them a trade surplus: a market that bought more from the colonial power than it sold overall. Britain, like most other industrial countries, had long since begun to run an unfavourable balance of trade. As Britain developed into the world's first post-industrial nation, financial services became an increasingly important sector of its economy.Invisible financial exports kept Britain out of the red, especially capital investments outside Europe, particularly to the developing and open markets in Africa such as to the white settler colonies, the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia. In addition, surplus capital was often more profitably invested overseas, where cheap materials,limited competition and abundant raw materials made a greater premium possible. Another inducement for imperialism arose from the demand for raw materials and Britain wanted the coasts of Africa for stopover to Asia.

[3] From the late-1780s onward, free blacks in the US established their own churches in response to racial
segregation in white churches. They were tired, for example, of being confined to church galleries and submitting to church rules that prohibited them from being buried in church cemeteries. In 1787 a young black Methodist minister, Richard Allen, along with another black clergyman, Absalom Jones, established the Free African Society, a benevolent organisation that held religious services and mutual aid for “free Africans and their descendants” in Philadelphia. In 1794 Jones accepted a position as pastor of the Free African Society’s African Episcopal Church of St. Thomas. Allen, desiring to lead a Methodist congregation, established in southern Philadelphia’s growing black community the Bethel African Methodist Episcopal Church, which also served as a way station on the Underground Railroad. Africa in the name of these early black religious institutions reflected an expansive worldview and an African consciousness evident also in Allen’s support for emigration back to Africa and Haiti. Indeed, in 1824 this impulse led approximately six thousand blacks from Philadelphia and other U.S. coastal cities to immigrate to Haiti; a community descended from Philadelphia blacks who settled in what was then eastern Haiti still exists in Samaná, a small peninsula city in the northeast of the Dominican Republic.

[4] Lasting a week, it drew, among others, Henry McNeal Turner and Alexander Crummell, the Egyptian Yakub Pasha, and African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church bishop Alexander Walters. Topics of discussion included “The African in America,” “Liberia as a Factor in the Progress of the Negro Race,” and “What Do American Negroes Owe to Their Kin Beyond the Sea.” That impulse toward an African identity was also apparent in the religious practices of enslaved people throughout the Americas, who tended to develop syncretic religions that blended African deities and belief systems with Christianity and Catholicism, giving rise to Santería in Cuba, Vodun in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and Candomblé in Brazil. In contrast, enslaved people in the United States tended not to develop elaborate belief systems, but their African-informed religious practices helped foster a sense of collective identity, just as Vodu and Santería did, and served as the basis of certain radical political practices. The Haitian revolution, itself facilitated and organised through Vodun, inspired several southern enslaved ministers like Nat Turner, Gabriel Prosser, and Denmark Vesey to lead or plot slave revolts.

[5]  Two groups, one led by Joseph Mathunye Kanyane Napo in 1888, the other by Mangena Maake Mokone in 1892, broke from the Anglican and Methodist churches, Mokone establishing the Ethiopian Church in 1892, which joined the African Methodist Episcopal Church four years later. This led to several South Africans visiting the United States and attending historically black colleges, including some of the earliest leaders of the African Native National Congress. Ethiopianism was also believed to have played a role in the 1906 Natal Zulu Rebellion. At the same time that Dusé Mohamed Ali prepared to launch his journal, a young Jamaican printer by the name of Marcus Garvey was travelling throughout the Caribbean and Central America. Garvey would land in Europe in 1912, and upon arriving in London, he joined the ATOR staff. Ali’s journal and the political ferment in London exposed Garvey to an even wider diasporic world than he had encountered in his travels throughout the Americas. He began to envision a global movement that would unite the race and found an African empire. Upon returning to Jamaica in 1914, Garvey established the Universal Negro Improvement and Conservation Association and African Communities League. He met little success in Jamaica, but a trip to the US to raise money and to meet Booker T. Washington altered his life.

[6]This congress also established a second Pan-African Association, which Du Bois controlled. This PAA fared little better than its first iteration, but it did allow Du Bois to stave off the deep schisms that began to develop between the Anglophone and Francophone participants. In 1923 Du Bois was able to convene a third PAC in London and Lisbon, Portugal. The approaching Paris Peace Conference would decide the future of Germany’s African colonies. Du Bois called for the Pan-African Congress to meet in Paris, and it was convened February 19–21, 1919. Presided over by Blaise Diagne of Senegal and Du Bois, it attracted delegates from throughout the African Diaspora, though no representatives came from the British West Indies, and hardly any were present from West Africa. White representatives from France, Belgium, and Portugal defended their countries’ colonial policies, while the U.S. representative William Walling argued that changes to American racial policies were on the horizon. Indeed, the resolution adopted at the congress tended more toward moderation and gradual reform than anything approximating a demand for immediate independence, calling on the proposed League of Nations to establish rules and codes for governing African colonial subjects and outlined a series of guidelines for governing Africans and peoples of African descent. n planning the second congress, he expressed a desire to “have a strong representation of the West Africans.” The second congress met in London, August 27–29, 1921, and in Brussels and Paris from August 31 to September 2, 1921. Importantly, a third of its participants came from Africa, though only seven of the 113 were from the Caribbean. The congress’s resolution came out more forcefully for self-government in Africa, the return of expropriated lands, development of the masses and for race leaders to align themselves more closely to black workers.

[7] Moore and Huiswoud soon emerged at the fore of an effort among black radicals in the communist movement to build an international organisation with African diasporic radicals from the Caribbean and Africa. The Trinidadian George Padmore had joined the American Communist Party while a student at Howard University in 1927. Rising rapidly within the party, he found himself in 1930 in Hamburg, Germany, heading the Communist International’s Negro Bureau and leading the newly formed International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers that organised black maritime workers in Europe, who helped circulate the organisation’s journal, The Negro Worker.

[8] Built over the last fifty years, the organisational imperative of the massive bureaucratic machine is to
command and control and is preoccupied with its own survival and enrichment. It is unlikely that the powerful
bureaucracy will abandon its privileged position and control of the state apparatus to democratically elected political leaders or respect the institutional restraints of democratic rule without struggle.

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NEVIS Review N0 18 , Section I , Ref# 18.1



NEVIS Review N0 18

Section I

Ref# 18.1
June 3, 2013
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(Ed’ Note: We would like to thank Dr Solomon for being supportive and positive in his response to our request to reproduce the article below in NEVIS Review. The following article appeared in africanarguments.org website, and was also presented at the ISS Seminar on 15 May 2013 at the ISS Addis Ababa conference room. Solomon A. Dersso, PhD is Senior Researcher on the Peace and Security Council Report Programme for Institute for Security Studies)
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African unity after 50 years of OAU/AU: A dream deferred?
 By Solomon Ayele Dersso (Phd)
As the AU is marking the 50th anniversary of the OAU under the theme ‘Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance’, it is necessary to subject the 50 years journey of the OAU/AU with respect to the question of unity to critical scrutiny.
To this end, it is imperative that we heed the counsel of former South African President Thabo Mbeki that in the context of the 50th anniversary of the OAU ‘We must answer some questions honestly: What progress have we made towards the achievement of the objectives set by the OAU, AU and NEPAD? What shall we do in this regard?’
This should involve an appreciation of the dismal performance of the continent on the question of African unity. Accordingly, in what follows I would like to highlight the road that post-independence leaders pursued and how it led to the betrayal of the promises of liberation and hence the dream of unity as well as the catastrophic consequence of this failure of the post-independence political class. In the process, I also hope to identify the major factors that impeded substantive progress towards the dream of the unification of people of the continent.
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The OAU years during the Cold War: the case of unity betrayed?
The birth of the OAU coincides with the emergence of the Cold War, which shaped global politics and indeed the relationship of the newly independent African states to global powers. In many ways, the OAU of the Cold War period can appropriately be considered as a period that manifested the betrayal of the dream of unity.
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The defeat of Nkrumah’s vision of unity in the May 1963 OAU founding conference in Addis Ababa
It should be stated that the OAU came into existence after a lengthy debate between diverse group of leaders. Indeed, in that historic month of May 1963 in Addis Ababa the 32 heads of state and government represented various forces including revolutionaries, reactionary and feudal forces, nationalists and puppets of former colonial powers. These diverse group of leaders were divided into two large blocks: the few of them supporting Nkrumah’s vision of a united states of Africa and the conservative and gradualist block that sought nothing more than a loose association.
In the ideological fight between the forces of unity and status quo, the OAU represented the victory of the forces of status quo and the defeat of Nkrumah’s vision of unity. G. G. Collins, British High Commissioner in Accra, in a 1963 memo described the defeat of Nkrumah’s vision of unity in the following terms
‘He (Nkrumah) had asked for a continental government of a Union of African States with a common foreign policy and diplomacy, common citizenship and a capital city; he got a loose organization which specifically provides for its members to be able to renounce their membership.
He had said that the Union of Africa would solve all border problems; he got a Commission of Mediation and clauses among the Principles of the Organization referring to non-interference in the internal affairs of states and to unreserved condemnation of subversive activities on the part of neighboring states.
He had asked for a continent-wide economic and industrial programme to include a common market and a common communications system, and a monetary zone with a central bank and currency; he got only a promise that commissions for matters economic and social, educational and cultural, scientific and technical might be set up.
He had asked for plans for a common system of defense; he got only the promise of a defense commission. When the conference Resolution to set up a Liberation Bureau was implemented, Ghana was not included.’
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Application of ‘We the Head of State and Government’ to its limits
In the years following 1963, the OAU years of the Cold War further entrenched existing divisions and added new once. First, the expression in the commencing words of the OAU Charter ‘We the Heads of State and Government’ was applied to its limits. The OAU became no more than a trade union of heads of state and governments, many of whom became in subsequent years violent dictators, Kleptocrats, self-appointed emperors and presidents for life. As aptly portrayed in Chinua Achebe’s Anthills of the Savannah, like the colonial authorities from whom they took political power, the post-independence political class treated the masses of their people with contempt, abuse and even brut force. Whatever unity that emerged within the OAU was a unity in dictatorship, corruption and misery. As the post-independence political class used its hold on power to accumulate personal wealth, indulge in excessive abuse of power and perfect despotic and violent rule as powerfully mirrored in Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s Wizard of the Crow, the promise and hope of the liberation struggle including the dream of unity soon turned into nightmare in many of the newly independent countries.
Most, if not all, independent countries became not only poor economies but also economies dependent on their former colonial countries. As Frantz Fanon in his celebrated book The Wretched of the Earth aptly summed up,
‘the national economy of the period of independence [was] not set on a new footing. It is still concerned with the ground-nut harvest, with the cocoa crop, the olive yield. In the same way there is no change in the marketing of basic products, and not a single industry is set up in the country. We go on sending out our raw materials, we go on being Europe’s small farmers, who specializes in unfinished products’.
This economics (mainly interested in accumulation of private wealth for the political class rather than serving the interests of the masses of the population and concerned with only export of raw materials) offered no motivation to build communication and transport infrastructure that connects the countries of the continent. Similarly, the logic of this economics also ensured that there could be no chance of intra-African trade and hence possibility of economic integration.
Second, the OAU served as a framework for entrenching the juridical sovereignty of its member states, which more often than not was used to shield the corrupt and violent system of governance perfected in many of its member states. First, shackled by its dogmatic adherence to the principle of non-intervention, the OAU became witness to the rampant miss rule and the many violations that took place in many countries including Central African Republic, Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, and former Zaire. Second, in the Cairo meeting in 1964 OAU member states adopted the principle of Uti Possidetis thereby affirming the deeply arbitrary colonial division of the continent. Third, OAU members adopted legal regimes relating to tariff and customs as well as entry and exist requirements.
The above developments had two negative consequences to the unity of the continent. First, they solidified and hardened the colonial fences separating the countries and peoples of Africa, deepening the colonial division of the continent and limiting free movement of people and goods.  Second, they gave rise to a politics of indifference that blocked OAU and its member states from coming to the defense of the people of Africa who, soon after independence, forced to endure a rule as brutal as that was found under colonialism.
The Cold War added a further division between the countries of the continent, as a divided and weak Africa was soon turned into a major theatre of the Cold War. As in the past, the interventions of the Cold War by global powers on the continent proved to be destructive.
Former South African President Thabo Mbeki best captured this devastation in the following terms:
Concretely, among other things, this resulted in such negative developments as the corruption of the African independence project through the establishment of the system of neo-colonialism, the overthrow of governments which resisted this, support for the white minority and colonial regimes in Southern Africa, seen as dependable anti-communist and anti-Soviet allies, the assassination of such leaders as Patrice Lumumba, Thomas Sankara and Eduardo Mondlane, sponsorship of such instrumentalities as UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Moçambique, support for predatory and client regimes such as those of Mobutu in the then Zaire, and of Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d’Ivoire
The above political, economic and security developments produced Africa of the 1990s.
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The OAU in the 1990s: African states individually disintegrating 
In his advocacy for heeding his vision of African unity, Nkrumah warned Africa that the failure to unify had serious consequences. He thus stated:
Salvation for Africa lies in unity…for in unity lies strength and I see it, African states must unite or sell themselves out to imperialist and colonialist exploiters for a mess of pottage or disintegrate individually.
The 1990s was a period when Nkrumah’s worst prophetic warning of the disintegration of African states individually was literarily born by actual events in many parts of the continent.
Thus, the immediate post-Cold War period became one of the darkest, bloodiest and bleakest of times for Africa. Outside of the slave trade and colonial era, at no other time violence have been more horrific and devastating than during this period. OAU member states were ‘disintegrating individually’ and it was as though Africa has gone ‘from the frying pan into the fire’.
In the 1990s Africa saw the descent of Somalia into protracted lawlessness and anarchy, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), formerly Zaire, into one of Africa’s brutal civil wars in which millions of people perished and Sierra Leone and Liberia civil wars that unleashed untold horor on civilian population of the two countries.
However, it was the 1994 Rwandan genocide that shock Africa to its core. In a period of one hundred days, close to 800,000 Rwandese, almost one tenth of the population of the country, were mercilessly massacred.
With none of those who scrambled for controlling the direction of the continent showing interest to come to the recue of people of the continent, ‘Africa was suddenly left to fend for itself’ as former Secretary General Kofi Annan put it. Unfortunately, the OAU, which developed into a disappointing symbol of the (dis)unity of the continent, failed terribly to do anything meaningful to avert or mitigate many of the calamities of the 1990s. As in the past, it did very little other than being witness to the brutal death, mayhem and displacement of millions of Africans and to its member states ‘disintegrating individually’.
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The AU: A false dawn of African unity?
The transformation of the OAU to the AU is indeed a major development in the evolution towards achieving the ideals of pan-Africanism. As Murithi rightly pointed out the AU ‘was supposed to usher Africa into a new era of continental integration, leading to a deeper unity and a resolution of its problems.’
The transformation of the OAU to the AU involved both normative and institutional Changes.
At the normative level, under the Constitutive Act of the AU, the AU made a complete break from the OAU in two major ways. First by redefining sovereinty where by the divisive OAU principle of non-intervention was replaced by a solidaity principle of non-indifference under Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act.
These normative changes were also accompanied by institutional changes. This involved the establishment of decision-making and implementation structures (the AU Assembly, the Executive Council, AU PSC, PRC and the AU Commission) representative and judicial institutions (Pan-African Parliament and the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights) as well as a continental development framework taking the form of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development with its governance monitoring and review process called the African Peer Review Mechanism.
Compared to the OAU years, Africa indubitably registered some commendable progress under the AU. This is particularly true with respect to peace and security. However, the promises unfulfilled are far more than those realized. Quite a number of limitations have been witnessed in the past decade.
The most notable and widely recognised limitation of the AU system is its heavy dependence on donor funding for its activities. For example, close to 90% of the funding for AU peace and security activities comes from donor funding.
Moreover, most AU member states do not make the diplomatic and military contributions needed for the effective implementation of the decisions they made. For example, the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) consisted of troops from only Uganda and Burundi for far too long, although all PSC members were involved in the decision to deploy AMISOM. Major contributions in terms of both troops and other resources for peace operations are borne by fewer than a dozen countries on the continent.
The AU’s slow pace of achieving consensus, the failure of its relatively well-positioned member states to provide expected levels of leadership and the resultant lack of appropriate action led to both political and security vacuum. Although it started off very well, currently the AU suffers from a dearth of leadership even on the part of its most pivotal member states such as South Africa and Nigeria.
There is also huge gap between commitments that member states made and their practice on the ground. Regime security continues to trump the demands of human security to which AU member states freely subscribed under various AU instruments. In this regard, former South African President Thabo Mbeki pointed out that one of the AU’s failures is ensuring that member states ‘respect the imperatives for democratic rule as spelled out in the Constitutive Act, and related decisions, centred on the strategic perspective that the people – the African masses – must govern’.
Another major issue has been the lack of a unified voice. This is evidenced by the divergence in the policy positions that AU member states take in their capitals, in Addis Ababa and in international forums such as in New York. In this regard, one area of manifest failure President Mbeki raised was what he called ‘the shameful African disunity and indecisiveness which resulted in the debacles in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya, which put in serious doubt our ability to determine our destiny, with present and continuing serious negative consequences for our continent’.
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Conclusion
The foregoing clearly illustrated that ‘this question of African unity’ encountered betrayals, failures of catastrophic consequences, missed opportunities and in some ways false dawns.
It was not anchored on a firm ideological conviction on the part of both the post-independence and subsequent political leadership of the continent. The leaders with the required conviction and vision were very few and far in between. Many others declared their conviction to African unity in public but did everything and conspired with others to exactly impede and frustrate the unification of the continent. The dream of African unification also lacked constituency among the wider public on the continent. In the years following the establishment of the OAU, it was made a reserve of a self serving political class with very limited, if any, presence in the works and practice of civil society, the media, public intellectuals of the continent.
Apart from its weak ideological and social foundations in the practice of the post-colonial African state and public, the required socio-economic infrastructure capable of facilitating its realization was also lacking. There were no transport and communication infrastructure to network and link up the countries and peoples of the continent. The solidification of the colonial fences through entrenching juridical sovereignty, sanctifying colonially carved deeply arbitrary borders, and the adoption of regulations imposing restrictions and tariffs on movement of people and goods further deepened the division inherited at independence. Lack of industrial development also mean that there existed very little for African countries to trade between themselves.
While under the AU there have been promising developments, the division and rivalry among African states are allowed to persist. Much of the current political class lacks the ideological conviction for advancing the ideal of unification with the urgency and determination it requires. Those with the position and capacity to mobilize the continent for higher level of political and socio-economic integration are divided and remain indecisive in providing the leadership expected of them. The continent has as yet to develop the required regulatory and physical infrastructure (communication and transport infrastructure, standardized trade frameworks, industrialization for producing finished products essential for intra-African trade) that facilitates economic integration and intra-regional trade.
The result is the continuing state of disunity among African states. After 50 years journey African unity still remains a dream deferred.
The major challenges to be overcome include addressing
  • the deficit in the ideological conviction of the political classes of the countries of the continent,
  • the lack of sustainable political commitment, and
  • the  current dearth of political leadership on the continent
  • the development of the required socio-economic and physical infrastructure
  • absence of societal wide awareness of and support for the unification project
Steps to be taken include
  • re-articulation and reaffirmation of the commitment for African unity as the surest means both for extricating the masses of the people from the prevailing socio-economic and political ills they find themselves in and for enabling Africa to participate in and contribute meaningfully for global development and prosperity as well as in the global quest for a just and humane world order
  • creating societal wide awareness of and constituency for African unity,
  • achieving the emergence of a coalition of countries with dedicated political leadership and commitment for pursuing the dream of African unity
  • outline a realistic and incentivised roadmap and strategy with benchmarks and realistic timelines as well as follow up mechanisms for integration
  • translating declarations and rhetoric of unity reflected in the plethora of commitments made under the AU into actions by contributing the required diplomatic and material resources to achieve the kind of integration and unification along the terms aptly put by Frantz Fanon:
The inter-African solidarity must be a solidarity of fact, a solidarity of action, a solidarity of concrete in men, in equipment, in money
Failure to achieve the above would leave countries of the continent divided by petty conflicts and struggles deferring the dream of unification for far too long. And as former South African President Thabo Mbeki warned ‘If this dream is deferred for much longer, surely, it will explode!’
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